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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 13751

HARRY MAE ST AS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This Is a criminal action charging appellant with
the offense of murder.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict of
guilty to the charge of murder in the second degree, the
defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment, and to
be granted a new trial. The specific relief sought is
release from the Utah State Prison pending retrial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was charged with first degree murder for
the shooting of Rosemary Matteucci on December 31, 1973.
A jury was selected and impaneled to try the facts
of the case on June 20, 1974. This jury included one Vern
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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D. Carpenter, who occupied seat number 12 in the jury box.
After the jury was impaneled, but before any evidence was
presented to the jury, a hearing was conducted in chambers
on June 21, 1974, concerning juror Carpenter.

At this hearing

(Tr. 124-140), it was disclosed that juror Carpenter has
discussed the case on two occasions with his son-in-law,
Bradley Dee, a television reporter with KCPX covering the
trial.

The first dicussion occurred sometime shortly after

the killing occurred, and the second took place on the evening
of June 20, 1974, after the jury had been impaneled.

Based

on these discussions, a mistrial was requested, which was
denied by the court.

(Tr. 143-148).

Evidence was introduced and received over the continuing objection of counsel as to other crimes allegedly
committed by appellant, in particular an armed robbery which
occurred on December 28, 1973. Five witnesses testified in
regards to the alleged robery:

Sheryl Cheever, the victim

of the robbery (Tr. 182-207); Deloy Kimball White, a police
officer investigating the robbery (Tr. 259-264); Willard
Craigen, another investigating police officer (Tr. 282-294,
299, 312-313); Phil K. Bodily, a police officer who arrested
appellant for the armed robery (Tr. 323); and Patricia Ann
Ratley, an admitted accomplice in the robbery (Tr. 445-456).
The evidence of other crimes was extensive, and included
identification in court, and the introduction and admission
into evidence of photographs of appellant previously identified
as the suspect. All objections to the receipt of such
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

testimony and evidence were denied by the court.
Numerous objections and motions were made as to
the evidence presented on behalf of defendant, which were
denied as is documented in Point III of this brief. These
rulings are discussed in terms of their cumulative effect.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT BELOW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL ON THE BASIS OF
JURY MISCONDUCT.
The leading case concerning the question of a
stranger's communication with a juror in a criminal case
i s Remitter v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ,

347 U . S . 227 ( 1 9 5 4 ) , i n w h i c h

the court vacated a judgment of guilty for wilful evasion of
payment of federal income taxes. The record presented to
the court did not disclose whether the outside contact was
harmful or harmless, but the court stressed that the integrity
of jury proceedings must not be jeopordized by any unauthorized
invasions.
"In a criminal case, any private communication,
contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly,
with a juror during a trial about the matter
pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons,
deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made
in pursuance of known rules of the court and
the instructions and directions the court made
during the trial, with full knowledge of the
parties. The presumption is not conclusive,
but the burden rests heavily upon the Government
to establish, after notice to and hearing of the
defendant, that such contact with the juror was
harmless to the defendant. Mattox v. United
States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150, 36 L.Ed. 917, 920,
921, 13 S. Ct. 50; Wheaton v. United States
(CA 8th SD), 133 F.2d 522, 527. Id, at 229."
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Although a standard for overcoming the burden has
not been delineated, one decision found that a juror informing
the court of the communication, and stating that he could
decide the case as if the incident had not occurred was not
sufficient, Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir.
1940) . The court recognized, in rejecting the jurors assertion
that he could weigh the facts fairly, that jurors are human and
not always conscious to what extent they are in fact biased
or prejudiced and their inward sentiments cannot always
be ascertained.
"The question is, not whether any actual wrong
resulted from the conversation. . .with the
juror. . .but whether it created a condition
from which prejudice might arise or from which
the general public would suspect that the jury
might be influenced to reach a verdict on the
ground of bias or prejudice. When the judgment
is weak, prejudice is strong, and it is essential
to faith in the jury system that jurors shall
determine the facts submitted to them wholly
on the evidence offered in open court, unbiased
and uninfluenced by anything they may have seen
or heard outside of the actual trial of the case.
Id, at 77."
This decision was followed in United States v.
Ferguson, 486 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1973), in which the juror
was removed, but not until after he had discussed the case
with other members of the jury.

Although the remaining

juror assured the court that he still had an open mind on
the case, it was held that the presumption of prejudice was
not overcome.
"The burden was on the Government to show that
no prejudice resulted from the communication.
Our insistence on this high standard was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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necessary, not only to insure that the defendant
received a fair trial by impartial jurors, but
also to maintain the integrity of the jury system.
Id, at 971."
One other case is pertinent to the issues presented.
In People v. Thomas, 120 Cal. Rptr. 637, 47 Cal. App. 3d
178 (1975) four jurors disclosed that they had read a newspaper story concerning the case, but each stated that he
was not influenced.

The court, placing special emphasis

on the fact that the jury had been impaneled but that no
testimony had yet been received when the disclosure was made,
held it to be an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for
mistrial.
Turning to the facts of the instant case, the record
discloses that the jury, after being impaneled, was expressly
instructed by the court "that it is your duty not to converse
with nor allow yourselves to be addressed by anyone or any
subject of the trial."

(Tr. 123 In. 27-30).

Subsequently,

but before any evidence was presented, it was disclosed that
juror Carpenter discussed the case on two occasions with his
son-in-law, a television reporter covering the case. The
first discussion occurred several months before the trial,
but juror Carpenter did not disclose this information to
the court during the jury selection process in response to
direct questioning by Judge Swan as to prior knowledge of
the case.

(Tr. 41-48).

The second discussion occurred after

the court's instruction not to discuss the case, which was
disclosed to the court only after it was brought to its
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attention by Bradley Deef the son-in-law who conversed with
juror Carpenter about the case, at the hearing.

(Tr. 124-140).

The State prosecutor, in attempting to meet its burden of
showing the contact to be harmless, elicited the opinion of
juror Carpenter that he could be an impartial juror and give
the defendant a fair trial (Tr. 130-135).

However, juror

Carpenter also stated that, if in the hypothetical that he
and the defendant were to switch positions, he would "probably
not" want a jury sitting which knew what he knew, and discussed
what he had discussed.

(Tr. 130 In. 7-21).

Bradley Dee who

testified at the hearing, disclosed that in the discussions
with juror Carpenter he related information from police reports
on the case, and that his opinion was liased in favor of the
police, that the defendant would be guilty.

(Tr. 138-140).

Juror Carpenter confirmed that Bradley Dee thought the defendant
to be guilty.

(Tr. 127-128).

Appellant submits that the State had the burden to
show that the communication with juror Carpenter was harmless,
and in no event prejudicial.

This burden was not satisfied

by the mere assertion by the juror that he would not let the
discussions influence his deliberation of the verdict, especially
in view of the circumstances presented.

It is also significant

to note the point of the proceedings at which the irregularity
was discovered.

The jury had been impaneled, but no evidence

had been presented, and there was an alternate juror sitting
on the case.

Under these additional circumstances, appellant

submits that it was both error and an abuse of discretion not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Carpenter.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT BELOW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT ALLOWED EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES TO BE ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE.
In reviewing the transcript (see Statement of Facts
for page citations), five witnesses testified as to an armed
robbery allegedly committed by appellant.

Photographic

evidence (Exhibits M and N) was introduced and received.

It

would be fair to say that the prosecution, in trying appellant
for homicide, presented a prima facie case for a crime of
which appellant was not properly before the court. The amount
of evidence presented seems to indicate that the prosecution
was trying to prove appellant guilty of armed robbery beyond
a reasonable doubt, rather than to introduce evidence of
other crimes for an admissible purpose.
The rule in Utah as to when evidence of crimes
other than the one at trial are admissible is well summarized
in State v. Lopez, 22 U.2d 257, 451 P.2d 775 (1969).

This

Court ruled in that case as follows:
"[E]vidence of other crimes is not admissible
if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as
a person of evil character with a propensity to
commit crime and thus likely to have committed
the crime charged. However, if the evidence
has relevancy to explain the circumstances
surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible
for that purpose, and the fact that it may tend
to connect the defendant with another crime will
not render it incompetent. Such harm as there
may be in receiving evidence concerning another
crime is to be weighed against the necessity of
full inquiry into the facts relating to the
issues. Id, at 775."
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The evidence introduced in the instant case falls
within the general rule of State v. Lopez, as it was unnecessary
to explain the surrounding circumstances of the crime charged,
nor was it relevant to the issues of the charge. Thus the
purpose of introducing such evidence could only have a purpose
to disgrace appellant and make him look like a man of evil
character likely to commit the crime charged.

Alternatively,

even if this Court should find some relevance to the evidence
of other crimes, the degree and extent to which the prosecution
placed upon such evidence was so great as to unduly prejudice
appellant.

The substantial prejudice of such extensive

introduction of evidence, when taken together, creates a
situation where it cannot be said with any degree of assurance
that there would not have been a different result in the
verdict by the absence of such evidence.
Additional Utah case law demonstrates the inappropriateness of the introduction of evidence going to other
crimes (or alternatively to the degree of such introduction).
In State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963), this
Court in noting the extent of testimony regarding crimes
not proven against that defendant, ruled such introduction,
to be prejudicial despite an admonition to the jury to disregard
offenses related in the testimony.

In State v. Dickson,

12 U.2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), questions were asked going
into detail regarding another crime for which that defendant
had not been tried.

This Court, in reversing the conviction

and granting a new trial, rejected justification for introducing
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such evidence under a modus operanti theory or for impeachment
purposes.

In State v. Peterson, 23 U.2d 58 457 P.2d 532

(1969) , that defendant was charged with selling an illegal
drug.

This Court held it to be prejudicial for the prosecution

to interrogate him as to his use of other narcotics, and that
such an error could be corrected only by remanding the case
for a new trial.

In State v. Gillan, 23 U.2d 372, 463 P.2d

811 (1970) , this Court reversed a conviction where evidence
was introduced to show a prior threatening incident made by
the defendant to a person other than the victim.

This Court

stated that evidence of other crimes must have a special
relevancy in proving the crime charged, rather than a tendency
for a particular characteristic.
Other Utah case law is adverse to appellant, but
can be distinguished for similar reasons; see State v. Baran,
25 U.2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970), State v. Johnson, 25 U.2d
160, 478 P.2d 491 (1970), and 01sen v. Swapp, 535 P.2d 1232
(Ut. 1975) . In each of these cases, the evidence of other
crimes were similar in nature to the crime charged.

Indi-

vidually, one case allowed evidence as to similar crimes
committed on the same evening (Baran), and another involved
evidence of a similar crime where the subject was introduced
into trial by the defendant (Olsen).

In the present case,

the crime charged is criminal homicide, which is not a
similar crime to robbery, nor was the alleged robbery
committed proximately close to the commission of the offense
charged, nor was it introduced into evidence by the appellant.
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Therefore, it is submitted that these cases are not in point,
and that resolution of this case is better established under
the principles of State v. Kazda, supra.
While this Court has stated on occasion that evidence
of other crimes may be admissible to show motive, it has not
had an opportunity to delineate as to what a proper case would
be for such an admission, and what the limits on the introduction of other crime evidence would be.

Recent case law

in other jurisdictions on this narrow subject is abundant,
and appellant would submit the principles of two representative
cases for guidance.

In United States v. demons, 503 F.2d

486 (8th Cir. 1974), the following guidelines were enunciated
as to evidence of other crimes.
"Before any such evidence is admitted, however,
it must be shown that (1) an issue on which
other crime evidence may be received is raised;
(2) that the proffered evidence is relevant to
that issue; (3) that the evidence is clear and
convincing; and (4) that the probative worth
outweighs the probable prejudicial impact."
In that case considerable time at trial was devoted
to the "other crime," and photographs were introduced in
support of such evidence.

The attention given to this

evidence was held to be prejudicial and the case was reversed
and remanded.

In United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 10 01 (6th

Cir. 1975), the court noted that even where other crimes
evidence has substantial independent relevancy, it should be
excluded when its probative value for the purpose offered is
outweighed by the danger that it will stir such passion in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration of
guilt of innocence of the crime on trial. The court noted
that evidence of prior bad acts may not be introduced unnecessarily
as a pretext for placing highly prejudicial evidence of bad
character before the jury, and that the mere recitation by
the prosecution that evidence of bad acts is offered under
an exception is not sufficient for its admission.

Accordingly,

the conviction was reversed and remanded.
Turning again to the facts and circumstances of
the instant case in view of the cited authority, the probative
worth of the other crimes evidence did not outweigh the
prejudicial impact. This is especially true when examining
the degree to which such evidence was stressed to the jury.
Such degree was unnecessary, and can only be regarded as a
pretext for placing bad character before the jury. While
the prosecution claimed the other crime evidence to be
admissible for showing motive, a justification not conceded
by appellant in this case, the prosecution did not elaborate
beyond the mere recitation of the justification, and then
proceded to present voluminous evidence going to the prior
robbery.

Thus, even if the evidence would have been justified

for admission, said justification was lost when the prejudicial
impact was compounded by extensive and unnecessary detail.
POINT III
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE COURT'S RULINGS ON
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR.
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The following is an index of objections and motions
made by defense counsel which were overruled by the trial
court:
Transcript
Page

Description

143-145

Motion for Mistrial on Basis of Jury Misconduct
(Denied at 147-148)

150-151

Objection to Relevency of Continuing Line of
Questioning

152

Objection to Question as leading

153

Objection to Statement as Conclusory

153

Hearsay Objection

157

Hearsay Objection

184-188

Objection to Evidence of other Crimes as
Admissible

212-213

Four Objections to Questions Leading *or
repetitious

216

Objection to Question as Leading

233-235

Motion for Mistrial on Basis of Information
not Released by Police

238

Hearsay Objection

259

Continuing Objection to Evidence of other
Crimes

260

Hearsay Objection

264-313

Objection to Admission of Photographs into
Evidence

280

Objection to Opinion or Speculative

283

Hearsay Objection

284-287

Motion for Mistrial on Basis of Evidence of
Other Crimes

291

Hearsay Objection
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292-294

Three Motions to Strike

293

Objection to Question as Leading

329

Objection to Statement as Conclusory

345-346

Objection to Question as assuming fact not
in Evidence

367

Objection to Question as Calling for Speculative
Opinion

416

Objection to Use of Document

423

Objection to Question as Speculative

447-448

Hersay Objection

453

Relevancy Objection

457

Hearsay Objection

459

Objection to Question as Leading

461

Objection to Question

471

Objection to Question as Leading

472

Hearsay Objection

484

Objection to Question

489

Relevancy Objection

567

Foundation Objection

572

Probativeness Objection

587

Foundation Objection

618

Objection to Condition Resting at Case by
Prosecution

622-649

Six Motions Made and Argued

650

Objection to Reopening of Case by Prosecution

668-675

Four Objections to Witness Reading Document

681, 692

Foundation Objection

690-691

Two Objections to Questions as Improper Redirect
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704

Hearsay Objection

705

Objection to Question as Leading

725

Motions Made and Argued at 622-649 Renewed

744

Objection to Question

869-870

Objection to Admission of Gun into Evidence

873-877

Renewed Motions plus Additional Motions Made
and Argued

878-879

Exceptions to Jury Instructions

879-882

Objection to Requested Jury Instructions Not
Given
The objections and motions which were denied

incorporate issues argued in Points I and II, as well as
others.

Appellant submits that the comulative effect of

these rulings requires that he be granted a new trial.
The leading case in Utah concerning the
cumulative effect of the ruling upon the evidence is State
v

- St. Clair, 3 U.2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955), in which the

defendant, convicted of murder, was granted a new trial.
This Court recognized the validity, upon appellate review,
to consider the cumulative effects of the trial court's
evidentiary rulings.
"None of the rulings on evidence, considered
singly, may seem of any great import. But the
defendant is nevertheless entitled to have them
considered cumulatively and as part of the overall picture in determining whether he had a fair
opportunity to present his defense. Id, at 328."
This Court went on to hold that not only could the
ruling on evidence be considered cumulatively, but that the
cumulative effect could be such as to require a new trial,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and cited prior decisions of the Court consistent with that
position.
"The proposition for us to decide here is not
whether any of the irregularities herein discussed would separately have been such as to
constitute prejudicial error and require a new
trial. It is recognized that a combination of
errors which, when singly considered might be
thought insufficient to warrant a reversal,
might in their cumulative effect do so. State
v. Vasquez, 101 U. 444, 121 P.2d 903, 140 A.L.R.
755 (1942); see State v. Moore, 111 U. 458,
183 P.2d 973 (1947). Id, at 332 (Footnote
added)."
In that case this Court found sufficient evidence
to support a conviction, but nevertheless granted a new
trial, in part because of uncertainty as to whether the
degree of the crime found in the verdict was tainted by the
cumulative effects of the trial court's rulings on the
evidence.
"Under such circumstances, we cannot affirm
with confidence that the result would have been
the same in the absence of the irregularities
mentioned. We are, therefore, impelled to the
conclusion that there is substantial doubt that
the defendant was properly convicted, which
doubt should be resolved in his favor, so that
we are conscientiously bound to grant a new
trial. Id. at 332."
Appellant submits that the present case is squarely
within the St. Clair decision.
The adverse rulings to appellant were many, but
the major ones should be reiterated.

First as argued in

Point I, was the retention of Juror Carpenter to sit on the
jury despite his misconduct in violation of the court's
admonition.

Second, as argued in Point II, was the evidence
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admitted as to other crimes allegedly committed by appellant.
Again, the degree to which such evidence was introduced is
the subject for complaint.

The testimony of the eyewitness-

victim to the robbery, the police testimony, and the two
photographs introduced in evidence went far beyond whatever
legitimate purpose for such testimony and evidence. The
revelation during the course of trial that information was
not released by police to defense counsel of a potentially
exculpatory character.

The motions argued near the con-

clusion of trial to dismiss the more serious charges
against appellant.

The exceptions and objections to the

jury instructions.

All of these points, plus the others

documented in the index demonstrate the cumulative effect
upon the fairness of appellant's conviction.

It cannot be

said with confidence that the trial result would have been
the same had not the irregularities occurred; it can be
said that there is substantial doubt whether appellant was
properly convicted.

For all these reasons, this Court

should grant appellant a new trial, under the controlling
mandate of State v. St. Clair, Supra.
CONCLUSION
As argued, the misconduct of juror Carpenter
necessitated his discharge from the trying of the case. The
failure to exclude this juror, and/or to declare a mistrial,
was error.
The admission into evidence of other crime
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evidence, because of the degree of such admission and its
character, was error.

The prejudicial import of such

evidence outweighed its probative worth.
Even if the conviction is not reversible under
the two specific contentions, the trial court made numerous
rulings on the evidence presented, which in their comulative
effect substantially prejudiced the appellant, whether or
not the individual rulings were sufficient error.

For each

and all of these reasons, appellant prays that the conviction
be reversed and the matter be remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

D. Gilbert Athay
Attorney for Appellant
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